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By Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd University College Cork University College Dublin
Internal communal conflicts vary so widely in their form that valid generalisations are not easily found (Brown, 1996; David, 1997) . Settlements are even more difficult to explain, for they vary not simply in the type of conflict, which they settle, but also in their status and stability (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, pp. 1-6) . Much contemporary scholarship searches inductively for recurrent proximate factors (or clusters of such factors) that explain settlement in a particular range of cases (Brown, 1996; Stedman, 2003; King et al, 2005) .
Other scholars proceed by applying general theoretical models drawn from international relations theory to settlement processes (David, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Hauss, DATE ) . Both approaches assume that similar causes lead to similar effects, that law-like generalisations can be found, at least if we suitably delimit the range of cases, that contemporary conditions are crucial in the causal process. But while existing work has identified a range of factors relevant to conflict and settlement 14, 577, it has not found substantive law-like generalisations (for example Brown, DATE). We propose a different research agenda, one that suggests that how these factors function, when they are relevant to settlement, may depend on their inter-relations and their embeddedness in historically developing patterns. If timing and sequencing are crucial, if path dependent patterns and longue durée processes are important, then we need to explain settlements by a historicallysensitive approach (cf Pierson, 2004 pp. ). We argue in this paper that such path-dependent patterns and processes regulate how the specific factors highlighted in other approaches function. As we show below, this is not a rejection of comparison or generalisation but a shift in its focus.
In what follows, we do not attempt to deal with the entire literature on settlement processes, but rather focus on four empirically promising and theoretically powerful approaches that highlight, respectively, relations of power, cognitive framing, social networks and institutional opportunities. 2 Using the test case of Northern Ireland, where a protracted conflict was brought to an agreed (if unstable) settlement in 1998, we show that none of these factors is sufficient to explain agreement in this case although is relevant to the settlement process. We show that these factors are closely interlinked and that the effects of each vary with their context and interlinkages. This is precisely the type of phenomenon where process, temporality, pattern and sequence are decisive (Pierson, 2004) . Rather than search for specific factors that correlate with settlement in general, we draw on approaches which build temporality into explanation, identify positive feedback, the path dependent 'lock-in' of patterns, and the modes es of point to by which this may be interrupted (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000 2006, 2004, p. 27; , 2000, pp. 529-35invites . . 2003; 2002; 2005, 1999, 2002exogenous factors.
Using the Northern Ireland case, this paper suggests that it is indeed possible to identify path-dependent patterns which generate conflict, embedded in turn in long-term processes of state development whose change may interrupt these patterns. The case-study highlights the impact of long-term state trajectories on patterns of conflict, their interrelation with actors' categorisations, and the impact of wider geo-political processes in intensifying change and in legitimating it for the actors. This resembles a model of institutional change in which exogenous shocks open 'windows of opportunity' which may or may not be taken depending on actors' policy preferences and the distribution of power resources (Cortell and Peterson, 1999) . However the endogenous/exogenous distinction is not clearcut in this case.: the path-dependent pattern is embedded in state structures and relations whose change is not independent of geo-political pressures, and which in turn impacts on policy preferences and power resources.
Competing explanations of settlement processes
Some of the most plausible and fruitful explanations of settlement prioritize one of the following four factors: power relations, cultural distinctions and cognitive frames, social networks (and their role in forming community boundaries) and institutional opportunities.
A focus on changing power relations has typified rational choice and neo-realist models of ethnic conflict and settlement processes (David, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998) . These approaches typically take as given the self-definition of the actors and their categorisation of their aims, and focus on their resources and strategies. Power is the key resource, and if power instability gives incentive for conflict, power stalemate -where actors can prevent each other from attaining their ends -gives incentive for settlement; settlement in turn is unstable without a credible guarantee that the weakening of one party's resources by compromise (disarmament etc) will not be exploited by the other (Zartman, 1989; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Walter, 2001) . The clarity and relevance of these arguments in highlighting factors which foster or subvert the quest for settlement are clear. But so too are their limits.
s'They assume actors' awareness of power stalemates, recognition of long-term objectives, belief in external guarantors, thus putting categorizations and perceptions back at the heart of analysis (Zartman, 2003) . Moreover, distinctions between different orders of time -the potential tension between short-term power stalemate and projected long-term shifts in the power balance -which are routinely made by actors in their calculations are insufficiently brought into this explanation.
A focus on cultural distinctions and cognitive frames is typical of 'new international relations' theories and cognitivist approaches to ethnic conflict. Some argue that the central factor in moving from conflict to settlement is perceptual -a perception of a hurting stalemate, a recognition that a win-win situation does, or can, exist -and that this can occur at any stage of conflict (Hauss, 2001, p. 218) . This approach also informs analyses of microprocesses of conflict which study how and when actors adopt or reject ethnic labels, link or de-link ethnic categories to personal dignity (Kakar, 1996; Brubaker, 2002 , Petersen, 2002 ).
Yet why such re-categorisations occur when they do is seldom adequately explained. One typical explanation appeals to the role of ideologues (or political entrepreneurs) as key agents in the process of collective self-definitions (Brubaker, 2002; McAdam et al, 2001 ).
Yet this raises the further question why some political entrepreneurs are effective, and others not. Another explanation goes beyond the cognitive to point to the importance of . These approaches build variously on theories of 'bridging' social capital (Putnam, 2003) , the role of civil society in transitions to democracy (for discussion, see Keane, 1998 ) and theories of how boundaries and distinction are challenged and maintained (Lamont, 2000) . While these approaches, however, can explain constraints on conflict and local variations in its form, they do not explain the move to settlement (see Farrington, 2004) .
A fourth approach gives particular attention to institutions -whether specific institutional design or longer-term institutional configurations -and the opportunities that they may give for compromise settlements (Keating, 20b01; McGarry and O'Leary, 2004; Coakley, 2003) . Given these interlinkages, with the effects of each factor varying with its context and combinations, then the detailed analyses of each must be supplemented with an historical and contextual approach which shows not only that but when each one becomes important.
In this paper we focus on one case where a settlement was finally reached after a quarter century of conflict. Other explanations of the 1998 agreement put shifting cognitive frames and cultural distinctions at the heart of the analysis. Changing ideologies preceded negotiations: all political parties adopted new discourses, which converged around international concepts of pluralism, equality and regionalism (Coakley, 2002; Bourke, 2003) . that ,4not as an indication of intent but in the pursuit of conflicting interests 2003).
Another strand in the literature stresses the crucial role of social networks of interaction and civil society organisations where communal boundaries are blurred. This explanation suggests that it was the build-up of bridging social capital that finally did the trick: it was 'people power', a public increasingly able to see beyond ethnic divisions towards everyday interests which sometimes converged and seldom directly conflicted, which impelled politicians towards settlement (Guelke, 2003) . Some explain the crises of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement by the failure of politicians to prioritise these civil society institutions and allow their voice to predominate (Wilson and Wilford, 2003) . While there is evidence that cross-community civil society organisations can restrain conflict and even provoke identity shift in settlement-sustaining directions (Darby, 1986; Hargie and Dickson, 2003; Todd, 2006) , their importance in producing settlement in this case is open to question.
First, there was a relatively small increase in institutionalised contexts of cross-community interaction in the decade preceding settlement.
3 Second, voting behaviour shows that the public, far from pressing the parties to maintain the Agreement, have rewarded those parties least likely so to do. so that these factors suddenly came to facilitate settlement? To answer these questions requires a different form of explanation.
-1999-tTpattern of relationships ing. O-Wright, 1996; (1798 , 1848 , 1916 , 1920 This intensified the process of British repositioning that had been ongoing, although very uneven, since 1969, which was facilitated and further intensified in a context of exogenous geo-political change. The shift in the role of the state(s) broke key aspects of the long-term pattern and opened a 'window of opportunity' that the parties were able and willing to use to reach an agreement.
From the start of the current round of troubles, nationalist pressure had provoked an uneven process of British reform, while the slowness of the process and the extent of repression had hardened nationalist (and particularly republican) resolve. Only by the 1980s did the governments recognise the extent of nationalist alienation and embark on a path to resolve it, breaking with the old pattern of territorial management, taking the Irish state, rather than the unionist community, as their local partner, and intensifying a programme of reform. The process strengthened nationalists institutionally, culturally and economically, with a knockon demographic impact. By the 1990s, republicans were aware of the new power resources potentially at their community's disposal and were contemplating an unarmed strategy, while unionists wished to negotiate a stronger position for themselves within the union. But there was no plausible form of agreement that did not weaken one or other party in the longer term. Meanwhile both Irish and British governments saw that more radical change was needed to bring stability in the short-term, and still more in the long-term when demographic change might provoke further crises.
Th process of state repositioning that began had potentially radical effects. By the 1990s, the government explicitly committed itself to a political reconstitution of Northern Ireland, in partnership with the Irish governmentrec2004These changes gave a rationale and a possibility for an agreement that was already in the strategic interests of both republicans (who stood to gain influence and build more power resources) and unionists (who needed to negotiate a safe place for themselves within the new United Kingdom). -is, 2000new 2006).
